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Abstract
We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is
made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilib-
rium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by
committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee
members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show
how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii)
increasing the plurality rule a®ect the equilibrium acceptance threshold and ex-
pected search duration. Finally, we show that unanimity is optimal if committee
members are su±ciently patient.
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1\A committee is a group that keeps minutes and loses hours." - Milton Berle
1 Introduction
In the classic sequential search problem, an individual makes one draw per period from
an exogenous and known distribution. These draws are independently and identically
distributed through time. After every draw, there is a decision to be made { to stop
and accept the payo® given by the realization of the most recent draw or to continue
searching. The bene¯t of further search is the expectation that a higher payo® will
eventually be realized; the cost is that the searcher's enjoyment of this payo® will be
delayed. Elaborations and applications of this optimal stopping framework abound in
economics. See [13], [16], and [17] for a set of excellent surveys.
Almost all of the search literature to date has a common feature, namely, that the
stopping decision is made by a single agent.1 For many applications, this assumption is
a good one, but often the decision to stop or to continue searching is made by a group
of agents. Consider, for example, an academic department that brings a sequence of
candidates to campus to interview for an open position, and suppose that after each
visit, a decision is made whether to make an o®er to the latest candidate or to continue
the search. This decision is typically taken by a group of faculty. Or, consider a couple
that is shown a sequence of rental properties. After each property is observed, the
couple decides whether to accept the latest apartment they have seen or to continue
their search. It is, of course, easy to think of other situations in which a group makes
a stopping decision.
We model this group decision as a problem of search by committee. As in the single-
agent problem, in each period, a group of agents (the committee) is presented with an
option. The values that the committee members place on this option are draws from an
exogenous and known distribution, and these draws are iid across committee members
and over time. In each period, the committee votes whether to stop or to continue.
1The single exception that we know of is a 2008 unpublished paper by O. Compte and P. Jehiel,
\Bargaining and majority rules: A collective search perspective," which we discuss below. At ¯rst
glance, the problem of household search considered in the 2009 unpublished paper, \Joint-search
theory: New opportunities and new frictions" by B. Guler, F. Guvenen and G. Violante might also
seem to be an exception. However, they use a unitary model; that is, their household behaves as if it
were a single agent.
1Speci¯cally, we consider a committee with N members and we suppose that at least
M votes are required to stop. The voting game played by the committee aggregates
its members' preferences. If at least M members ¯nd the current option acceptable,
the search stops; otherwise, the search continues. Our approach thus combines two
literatures, sequential search and private-values voting.
What do we learn from this combination? First, we show that the problem of search
by committee is well posed. A symmetric stationary equilibrium exists and is unique
given a log concavity assumption on the distribution of payo®s.
Second, we compare the outcomes of committee and single-agent search. Suppose
the committee and the single agent face the same environment, i.e., the same distri-
bution of payo®s and the same cost of delay. We show that committee members are
always less picky than a single agent would be in the same environment in the sense
that the acceptance threshold set by the committee members is always less than the
threshold the single agent would set. In equilibrium, the acceptance threshold equals
the discounted value of continuing to search; thus, the expected discounted payo® to a
committee member is less than the corresponding value achieved by the single searcher.
The fact that committee members set a lower acceptance threshold than a single agent
need not imply, however, that expected search duration is shorter for a committee than
it is for the single agent. In fact, the comparison between the expected duration of
search for a committee and for a single searcher depends on the cost of delay in an
interestingly non-monotonic way. Speci¯cally, so long as unanimity is not required,
the committee can expect to end its search faster than a single agent would if the cost
of delay is either su±ciently low or su±ciently high. We also show that a standard
result from the single-agent search literature, namely, that a single agent raises his or
her acceptance threshold in response to a mean preserving spread in the distribution of
rewards, can be reversed in the search-by-committee problem. In this sense, committee
search is more conservative than is single-agent search. The two results, less picky and
more conservative, follow from two fundamental elements of the search-by-committee
problem. First, committee members impose externalities on each other that are by
de¯nition absent in the single-agent problem. (See [5] for a related point in a static
voting game.) Second, the voting game played by its members de¯nes a value function
(the expected discounted payo®) for the committee. The value function in the single-
2agent problem is necessarily convex, but the committee value function is necessarily
not convex.
Third, we examine the e®ects of changing the size of the committee on the accep-
tance threshold and on expected search duration. We do this holding the fraction of
votes required to stop ¯xed; that is, we increase both M and N while holding M=N
¯xed. For example, we examine the e®ects of moving from a situation in which at
least 2 out of 3 votes are required to stop to one in which at least 4 out of 6 votes are
needed. We show that increasing committee size in this way leads to a decrease in the
acceptance threshold. Equivalently, committee members are worse o® as the size of the
committee increases. We also show that, when unanimity is not required, increasing
the size of the committee while holding the plurality fraction ¯xed decreases expected
search duration so long as committee members are su±ciently impatient; on the other
hand, increasing the size of the committee increases expected search duration when
unanimity is required to stop.
Finally, we consider the e®ect of varying the plurality rule, M, holding committee
size ¯xed. We show that expected search duration is always increasing in M: Starting
with low values of M, the acceptance threshold increases as the required number of
votes increases. However, if at some point an increase in M leads to a decrease in the
acceptance threshold, then further increases in M also cause the acceptance threshold
to fall. We also show that the welfare-maximizing choice of M increases as committee
members become more patient and that unanimity is optimal for high enough (but
bounded) rates of patience. The idea that unanimity can be optimal is in contrast
to a standard result (e.g., [10]) from the common-values voting literature, albeit in a
di®erent context.
To make progress on a new problem, we have made simplifying assumptions. On
the search side, we restrict our attention to the stationary sequential problem, and we
assume that once an option is discarded it is lost forever to the committee (no recall).
These assumptions are close to those of [14]. That is, we use a simple, one-sided
search framework and do not embed the search-by-committee problem in a market
environment in which the distribution of payo®s is endogenously generated by the
actions of agents on the other side of the market. On the voting side, we restrict our
attention to the private-values case, in which the values that committee members place
3on the option at hand are iid draws.2 Thus, we do not allow for the possibility that
voting can convey information. More fundamentally, we restrict the strategies available
to committee members in the voting game. We consider Markovian strategies in which
each committee member's vote (stop or continue) depends only on the option at hand.
Thus our voting model harks back to the pioneering work of Hotelling and Black ([12]
and [4]).3
As mentioned in footnote 1, Compte and Jehiel also consider a collective search
problem. In both our paper and theirs, a committee considers a sequence of iid draws,
and the problem is to ¯nd an equilibrium in the committee members' stopping rules.
In our model, each committee member's reaction to an option is the realization of an
idiosyncratic random variable. Compte and Jehiel consider our case, but only for a
uniform distribution of rewards. They also allow the possibility that the committee
members may have intrinsic di®erences in their tastes. However, this increased gener-
ality comes at a cost { almost all of their interesting results require the discount rate
to go to one, i.e., the situation in which there is no time cost to search. In contrast,
our results are not restricted to the limiting case. Indeed, some of our more surpris-
ing results depend critically on allowing for low discount rates (Propositions 3 and 4).
Relative to their paper, our contribution is to give a much more general and complete
analysis of the \symmetric" case. As this is the natural generalization of the canonical
McCall sequential search problem, our primary contribution is to the search literature.
In contrast, their contribution is primarily to the bargaining literature. In this sense,
the two papers are natural complements.
In the next section, we describe our model and prove the existence of a unique
symmetric stationary equilibrium. In Section 3, we compare search by committee
to single-agent search and show that committee members are less picky and more
2Committee members who share a sense of purpose could be modeled as making positively corre-
lated draws. A general approach to this problem would therefore posit a±liated values, as is often
done in auction theory (see [15]). Two polar cases would then be perfectly positively correlated draws
(common values) and our case of iid draws. The former coincides with the single-agent search prob-
lem. The case of iid draws a®ords two advantages. First, it is far more tractable than a±liated values.
Second, it is the unexplored polar case, and the results in an a±liated values model are surely a blend
of our new results and those of the well understood single-agent problem.
3We follow the terminology of Black, who also calls a collection of voters a committee. In his
model, the committee decides between a proposal and the status quo. In our model, the proposal is
the current option and the status quo is continuing to search. In [4], the status quo is exogenous,
while the value of the \status quo" is endogenous in our model.
4conservative. We elaborate on the two crucial aspects of the search-by-committee
problem that drive these results, externalities and non-convexities, in the context of
the simplest possible committee, namely, the case of N = 2. Section 4 explores how
the acceptance threshold and expected search duration vary in committee size (holding
the plurality fraction ¯xed) and in the number of votes required to stop. Finally, in
Section 5, we conclude.
2 The Model
2.1 Assumptions
A committee is a pair (N;M), where N is the number of members and M is the number
of votes required to end the search. Time is discrete, and all committee members dis-
count the future at common rate ± 2 (0;1). In each period, the committee is presented
with an option. Each committee member then draws a value for the option from a
continuous cdf F : [0;1] 7! [0;1] with positive density f. These values can represent
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility payo®s or monetary payo®s for risk neutral agents.
We assume value draws are iid both across time and across committee members. We
rule out side payments, i.e., utility is non-transferable.




0 (1 ¡ F(s))ds are log concave in z | for
which it su±ces that f be log concave, as is well-known. To see how we use these
assumptions, de¯ne the truncated means:
¹h(z) ´ E[XjX ¸ z] and ¹`(z) ´ E[XjX < z]:
The above log-concavity assumptions imply that ¹0
h(z) · 1 and ¹0
`(z) · 1 as is shown
in [6].4 We use these two upper bounds to establish uniqueness of equilibrium and
also to sign some of our comparative statics results. Log concavity assumptions are
common in many economic applications (search, signaling, mechanism design, etc.).
See [3] for a survey of log concavity results and applications.
Each period is divided into two stages. In the ¯rst stage, the option arrives and
each committee member's value is realized. In the second stage, the committee decides
4Similar results can be found in [11] and in [19].
5whether to stop searching and accept the most recently observed option or to continue
to the next period. By restricting voting to stopping with the most recent option or
continuing to search we are ruling out recall; i.e., once an option is discarded it is
lost forever.5 We model this choice using a simple voting mechanism: the committee
members simultaneously vote either to stop and accept the current option or to continue
to search. The search ends if and only if at least M committee members vote to stop.
Each committee member seeks to maximize his or her own discounted payo®.
A strategy for committee member i is a sequence of functions ¾i = f¾i(t)gt, such
that ¾i(t) maps from possible histories through time t to the set fcontinue, stopg.
Player i employs a Markov strategy if ¾i(t) is only a function of the most recently
evaluated option. We restrict attention to symmetric stationary equilibria in which all
players employ the same Markov strategy.
We assume that the above description of the model is common knowledge among
the committee members. Given our Markovian restriction, whether individual draws
are private or public information is immaterial. Further, whether an agent knows in
advance that he or she is pivotal is also irrelevant.
2.2 Equilibrium
Once we assume no recall and stationary Markov strategies, cuto® strategies are opti-
mal for the same reason they are optimal in single agent search problems: the continu-
ation value is a constant with respect to the current draw. Suppose all other committee
members set acceptance threshold z0: We de¯ne W(z;z0;N;M;±) to be the expected
continuation value starting just before draws are made for a committee member who
sets acceptance threshold z for all future time periods while all other committee mem-
bers use threshold z0: Then we have
W(z;z
0;N;M;±) = P(z
0;N ¡ 1;M ¡ 1)±W(z;z
0;N;M;±) + (1 ¡ P(z
0;N ¡ 1;M))E[X]
+p(z




5In single-agent search, the no-recall assumption is without loss of generality. However, search by
committee is a game, and thus non stationary strategies can potentially be supported in equilibrium
by conditioning on past history. With recall, the state variable is the entire past history of draws, so
the no-recall assumption is important in the committee search problem. The assumption of Markov
strategies, however, takes the bite out of the no-recall assumption in the committee search problem.





(1 ¡ F(z0))iF(z0)N¡1¡i is the (binomial) probability
that exactly i of the other N ¡ 1 members draw a value greater than or equal to z0
and P(z0;N ¡ 1;i) =
Pi¡1
j=0 p(z0;N ¡ 1;j) is the probability that i ¡ 1 or fewer of the
other N ¡ 1 members vote to stop. Notice that if p(z0;N ¡ 1;M ¡ 1) = 0; i.e., if
the probability that this committee member is pivotal equals zero, his or her payo® is
independent of z: In this case, we impose the re¯nement that the committee member
chooses z to solve maxf±W(z;z0;N;M;±);xg when the reward drawn is x:
We seek a symmetric stationary equilibrium, so we de¯ne V (z;N;M;±) = W(z;z;N;M;±):
Substituting and simplifying yields
V (z;N;M;±) = P(z;N;M)±V (z;N;M;±) + (1 ¡ P(z;N;M))­(z;N;M);
where ­(z;N;M) is the expected payo® conditional on stopping. Rearranging, we have




An agent's payo® is only a®ected by the cuto® chosen when he or she is pivotal, i.e.,
when exactly M¡1 of the remaining N¡1 agents vote to stop. Thus, best responses are
determined by considering a pivotal voter, who can choose either to stop and accept
the most recently drawn reward, x, or instead continue. The pivotal agent solves
maxfx;±V (z;¢)g. Since the continuation value, V (z;¢); is a constant with respect to
the current period's decision, the optimal strategy is an acceptance threshold, i.e., vote
for an option i® its value exceeds some threshold. Thus, if all members set threshold
z in the future, the acceptance threshold for the pivotal voter equates the values of
stopping and continuing, given that he or she is pivotal now, i.e., x(z) ´ ±V (z;¢).
For an equilibrium to be stationary and symmetric the following equilibrium con-
dition must be satis¯ed:6
x
¤ = ±V (x
¤;¢):
In equilibrium, V (x¤;¢) is the expected payo® for each committee member. Equiva-
lently, since V (x¤;¢) is proportional to x¤; the equilibrium acceptance threshold can be
6The equilibrium re¯nement discussed above excludes the trivial equilibria in weakly dominated
strategies in which all agents set a threshold of zero or a threshold of one.
7used as a measure of each committee member's welfare.
To establish existence and uniqueness and to characterize equilibrium, our ¯rst step
is to show that ­(x;N;M) is a weighted average of ¹h(x) and ¹`(x) and to bound its
derivative with respect to x: These results are given in Lemma 1. The proof is given
in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 The stopping value ­(x;N;M) is a weighted average of the truncated means
¹h and ¹`; and 0 · ­x(x;N;M) · 1.
Having characterized ­(x;N;M); we now state the main result of this section.
Proposition 1 A symmetric stationary Markov equilibrium exists and is unique.
The details of the proof are in the Appendix. However, the basic idea is straight-
forward, as shown in Figure 1. Existence follows from V (0;¢) = E[X] > 0, V (1;¢) = 0,
and V (x;¢) continuous in x. To establish uniqueness, we need to show that ±V (x;¢)
crosses the 45-degree line only once, i.e., that ±Vx(x;¢) < 1: This last condition follows
from the inequality ­x(x;N;M) · 1 established in Lemma 1 and ± 2 (0;1):








Figure 1: We have graphed 0:9V (x;2;2;0:9) and X uniform on [0;1] to illustrate our
equilibrium: x¤ ¼ 0:515.
83 Comparison to Single-Agent Search
In this section, we compare the symmetric stationary committee search equilibrium
outcome with the outcome in the case of a single searcher. We ¯rst show that committee
members are less picky than a single searcher would be in the same situation; i.e., the
committee members set a lower acceptance threshold in equilibrium. We then show that
committees conclude search more quickly for extreme (high or low) rates of patience
but that the comparison can be reversed for intermediate rates of patience. Finally,
we establish that committees are more conservative than single searchers in the sense
that a mean preserving spread in F can lower the committee members' equilibrium
acceptance threshold.
3.1 Committees are Less Picky
For ¯xed ± and F; we say that committee members are less picky than a single agent
if the equilibrium acceptance threshold of the committee members is lower than the
acceptance threshold that a single searcher would set. We establish the following in
the Appendix.
Proposition 2 (Less Picky) Committee members are less picky than a single searcher.
The idea of the proof is straightforward. The single searcher can achieve at least as
high an expected payo® as a committee member by mimicking the committee behavior
but can then improve his or her payo® by optimizing. Since in equilibrium expected
welfare is proportional to the acceptance threshold, committee members are less picky
than a single searcher.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. A single searcher maximizes his or her
continuation value, but a pivotal committee member cannot count on the committee
doing so. More speci¯cally, there are two negative externalities that committee mem-
bers can impose on one another that do not arise in the single-searcher case. They
can vote to stop when a committee member has drawn a low value or they can vote to
continue when the committee member has drawn a high value. These externalities lead
committee members to set a lower acceptance threshold than would a single searcher.7
7In the BÄ orgers model of costly voting and voluntary participation ([5]), there is a single negative
externality that arises because an individual's decision to participate makes it less likely that others
9Note that this argument does not require independence of draws. Committees are less
picky than single searchers even with correlated values, as long as the correlation is
not perfect, at which point the single-agent and committee problems are identical.
3.2 Patient and Impatient Committees Conclude Search Faster
We know that committee members set an acceptance threshold that is below the cor-
responding threshold for a single searcher (holding F and ± constant), but this does
not necessarily imply that the committee has a shorter expected search duration. In
fact, the committee may take longer to search, as the following example illustrates.
Example 1 Let X be uniform on [0;1] and ± = 0:8: Then a single searcher sets
threshold 0:5, i.e., stops with probability 0:5. With N = 5 and M = 4, the equilibrium
committee threshold is approximately 0:37, which yields a probability of stopping of
approximately 0:39; i.e., the committee searches longer on average.
The point illustrated by the above example is simple. We can, however, say some-
thing considerably less obvious about expected search duration. The comparison of
expected search duration between a committee and a single searcher has an interesting
non-monotonicity in ±. While expected search duration rises in ± for committees and
for single searchers, the rate of change di®ers between committees and single searchers,
so that the sign of the di®erence in expected search duration is not monotonic.
Our comparison of expected search duration between a committee and a single
searcher relies on the following property of the binomial distribution:
Lemma 2 If N ¡ n > M ¡ m > 0, 9 ¹ x 2 (0;1) such that P(x;N;M) ¡ P(x;n;m)
satis¯es single crossing, negative for x < ¹ x and positive for x > ¹ x.
Note that the continuation probability for the single searcher is F(x) ´ P(x;1;1):
The lemma is stated in a more general form because we use it again when we consider
the implication for expected search duration of increasing committee size holding the
plurality fraction constant.8
are pivotal and thus imposes a cost on them.
8Lemma 2 is related to a classic problem in probability theory. In 1693, the essayist Samuel Pepys
asked Isaac Newton which of the following was most likely: (i) at least one \6" in 6 rolls of a fair die,
10Proposition 3 If M < N, then committees conclude search more quickly than indi-
viduals for su±ciently low and su±ciently high rates of patience.
Formally, we show in the Appendix that there exists 0 < ±L · ±H < 1 such that
expected search duration is lower for the committee whenever ± = 2 (±L;±H). When
±L = ±H; expected search duration is always lower for a committee.
To understand why committees conclude search faster for extreme rates of patience
(and also why the comparison may be reversed for medium rates of patience), note
that expected search duration depends on both the acceptance threshold (the thresh-
old e®ect) and the probability of stopping given any acceptance threshold (the vote
aggregation e®ect). Since committee members are less picky, the threshold e®ect al-
ways pushes committees toward concluding search faster. Thus, committees can only
search longer if the vote aggregation e®ect is dominant and has the opposite sign of
the threshold e®ect.
For low x, when M < N; Lemma 2 implies P(x;N;M) < F(x). This means that
whenever the committee and single-searcher acceptance thresholds are low enough, the
vote aggregation e®ect reinforces the threshold e®ect, and the committee expects to
conclude search faster. Low ± implies low acceptance thresholds, which implies that
committees conclude search faster on average for low enough ±. This is illustrated
in Figure 2. Above, we interpret low ± as impatience. Alternatively, since ours is a
discrete-time model that does not specify the length of a period, we could interpret
low ± as a situation in which there is a long interval between the arrival of options.
If ± is high, we cannot make the same argument. In fact, for high enough acceptance
thresholds, the vote aggregation e®ect must have the opposite sign from the threshold
e®ect (as long as M > 1). So the question becomes: which e®ect dominates? As ± ! 1;
the single-agent threshold goes to 1; thus, the probability of continuing goes to 1. As
long as M < N; the committee threshold is bounded away from 1 as ± ! 1 because
as a weighted average of the truncated means, ­ < 1. This in turn implies that the
committee's probability of continuing is bounded away from 1. Thus, for su±ciently
(ii) at least two \6's" in 12 rolls of a fair die, or (iii) at least three \6's" in 18 rolls of a fair die. In
our notation, if X is uniform on [0;1]; the question is how P(x;N;®N) is ordered for x = ® = 1=6
and N = 6;12;18: As discussed in [18], the answer that Newton gave was correct, but his explanation
only applies when the die is fair. More generally, it is interesting to know how P(x;N;®N) is ordered
for all values of x;N and ®: Lemma 2 addresses this question.
11high ±, the threshold e®ect must dominate the vote aggregation e®ect. High ± can
be interpreted either as patience or a situation in which options arrive quickly. For
intermediate values of ±, the vote aggregation e®ect can be of the opposite sign and
dominant as in Example 1. However, this intermediate range need not exist. For
example, if N = 2 and M = 1 and values are distributed uniformly on [0;1]; then the
committee has a lower expected search duration than a single agent for all discount
rates.











Acceptance Thresholds Probability of Stopping
± ±
Figure 2: We compare the optimal single-agent solution to the committee equilibrium
with (N;M) = (5;4) and X uniform on [0;1]. In the graph on the left, we compare
the single-agent acceptance threshold, ~ x (dashed line) to the committee threshold x¤
(solid line). On the right, we compare the probability of stopping for a single agent,
1¡F(~ x) (dashed line) to the probability of stopping for the committee, 1¡P(x¤;5;4)
(solid line).
3.3 Committees are More Conservative
In this subsection, we show that committee members are more conservative than they
would be were they single searchers. By more conservative we mean that a committee
member may reduce his or her acceptance threshold in response to a mean preserving
spread in the distribution of rewards, F: Equivalently, since the acceptance thresh-
old gives each committee member's expected welfare, an increase in risk may make
committee members worse o®. In the single-agent search problem, however, mean pre-
serving spreads in F are always good news, increasing continuation values and raising
12acceptance thresholds. To see that a mean preserving spread can reduce the acceptance
threshold for a committee member, consider the case in which X is uniform on [x;x].
Let ± = 0:65 and M = N = 2. If [x;x] = [1;3] then x¤ ¼ 1:25, while if [x;x] = [0:5;3:5]
then x¤ ¼ 1:22.
The increase in the single searcher's acceptance threshold follows from considering
the individual's value function º which solves the recursion º(x) = maxfx;±E[º(X)]g.
Since º is the max of a constant and a linear function, º is convex. As is well known,
mean preserving spreads increase the expectation of a convex function, so that E[º(X)]
increases in mean preserving spreads. In turn, the acceptance threshold for single
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Figure 3: Joint value function. We show v(x;y) in each region, given symmetric
threshold z and continuation value V .
Why does this simple logic not carry over to the committee problem? To provide
insight, let N = 2 and consider an analogous value function approach to the committee
problem. Let v(x;y) be the sum of the two committee members' payo®s given that
they both set threshold z and draw values (x;y). Our continuation value function is






where v(x;y) = x+y when the committee stops searching and 2±V (z;¢) otherwise. In
Figure 3, we consider the function v. Any symmetric threshold z divides the unit square
13into four regions. If M = 1; then (x;y) < (z;z) is the continuation region in which
v(x;y) = 2±V (z;¢), while v(x;y) = x+y elsewhere. When M = 2; then v(x;y) = x+y
on the stopping region (x;y) ¸ (z;z); and v(x;y) = 2±V (z;¢) elsewhere.
Negative externalities obtain in Regions I and IV. For example, when M = 1, in
Region I, member 2 forces a conclusion to the search problem despite a relatively low
draw by member 1. When M = 2; it is member 1 who imposes a negative externality
on member 2 in Region I, forcing a continuation of search even though member 2 has
drawn a high value.
Now consider how changes in F a®ect the continuation value and the threshold x¤
by examining equation (1). As in the single-agent problem, continuation values and
acceptance thresholds must be increasing in ¯rst order stochastic dominance changes
in F since v is increasing in both x and y. What about mean preserving spreads in
F? If v were convex in x and y, then we would get monotonicity in mean preserving
spreads in F, as in the single-agent problem. However, it turns out that v is not convex
in x and y.
To see the non-convexities, ¯x M = 1 and again consider Figure 3. Take any
three pairs (x;y);(x0;y0);(x00;y00) and any ¸ 2 (0;1) such that (x;y) = ¸(x0;y0) + (1 ¡
¸)(x00;y00), x0 < x < z < x00, and y00 < y < z < y0, i.e. (x;y) in Region III, (x0;y0) in
Region I and (x00;y00) in Region IV. Then v(x;y) = 2±V = 2z (in equilibrium) and
¸v(x
0;y




0) + (1 ¡ ¸)(x
00;y
00) = x + y:
Finally, 2z > x + y since z exceeds x and y individually. Thus, when M = 1, v is not
everywhere convex in (x;y). To see that v is not convex in (x;y) when M = 2, choose
pairs such that (x0;y0) is in Region I, (x00;y00) is in Region IV, and (x;y) is in Region
II. Then v(x0;y0) = v(x00;y00) = 2z < v(x;y) = x + y.
While v is not convex in (x;y), given our independence assumption we could still
prove monotonicity in mean preserving spreads in F if v(x;y) were convex in one
variable holding the other ¯xed (bi-convex). However, this weaker convexity condition
is also not met. We show this in Figure 4, in which we graph v(x;y) for M = 1 and
y < z (left) and v(x;y) for M = 2 and y > z (right). These non-convexities have an

















Figure 4: v is not bi-convex. We graph v(x;y) as a function of x holding y ¯xed. In
the graph on the left: M = 1 and y < z, while on the right: M = 2 and y > z.
the boundary x = z, agent 1 is just indi®erent between continuing and stopping, while
agent 2 strictly prefers continuing (y < z). Thus, agent 1 confers a negative externality
on agent 2, and the joint payo® jumps down discontinuously. Similarly, when M = 2
and y > z, agent 2 strictly prefers to stop, so that agent 1 confers a negative externality
on agent 2 by forcing continuation when x < z, and the joint payo® discontinuously
jumps upward at x = z.
4 E®ects of Committee Size and the Plurality Rule
In this section, we investigate the e®ects of committee size (N) and the plurality
rule (M) on the equilibrium acceptance threshold and on expected search duration.
Since, as we noted in Section 2, the equilibrium acceptance threshold is proportional
to the expected payo® for each committee member, our results have both positive and
normative implications.
4.1 Committee Size
We ¯rst examine the e®ects of changes in committee size. We do this holding the
fraction of votes required to stop, ® = M=N, constant, recognizing that the committee
problem is only de¯ned when ®N is an integer. This assumption means that as we
increase committee size, we are proportionally increasing the number of votes required
to stop. An increase in committee size, holding ® constant, decreases the acceptance
threshold; i.e., individual committee members have lower expected payo®s. When
15it comes to expected search duration, there is again both a threshold e®ect and a
vote aggregation e®ect. The threshold e®ect unambiguously acts to decrease expected
search duration as the size of the committee grows, while the vote aggregation e®ect
reinforces the threshold e®ect at low values of x (equivalently, for low values of ±) but
counteracts it at higher values of x: The pattern exhibited by the vote aggregation
e®ect follows from Lemma 2. Our ¯nal result on the e®ects of a change in committee
size is that, when unanimity is required to stop, increasing the size of the committee
causes expected search duration to rise. We summarize the above discussion in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 4 If M = ®N, then x¤ falls in N. If ® < 1; there exists a ±L > 0 such
that expected search duration falls in N for ± < ±L: If ® = 1; expected search duration
rises in N:
The result with respect to x¤ presented in Propostion 4 is related to our result that
committees are less picky. In a sense, the latter is more general than the result with
respect to x¤ in Proposition 4 in that it compares the single searcher (a committee
with M and N equal to 1) to committees with any values for M and N; i.e., it does
not require ® = M=N constant.
The intuition for why x¤ falls when N increases holding M=N ¯xed is the same as
that underlying Proposition 2; namely, additional committee members imply additional
externalities. The method of proof, however, is more involved. The idea behind our
proof of Proposition 2 was simple { the single searcher can always mimic committee
behavior. Since the single searcher can in fact do better than that, he or she must
achieve a higher payo®; equivalently, e x > x¤: That logic cannot be carried over to our
proof of Proposition 4. Suppose we compare a situation in which at least one vote out
of two is required to stop to a situation in which at least two votes out of four are
required. In order to mimic the behavior of the larger committee, the two members
of the smaller committee would have to coordinate their behavior. Thus, we have to
examine directly how V (x¤;N;®N;±) = S(x¤;N;®N;±)­(x¤;N;®N) varies with N:
The key step, which is nontrivial, is to show that ­(x¤;N;®N) falls in N: That is, as
the size of the committee increases while holding the plurality fraction constant, the
expected payo® per committee member conditional on stopping falls. The details are
given in the appendix.
16By Lemma 2, the probability of continuing exhibits a single crossing as N increases
holding M=N constant. Thus, as in Proposition 3, the result for expected duration
involves a comparison of two opposing e®ects { the vote threshold e®ect and the ag-
gregation e®ect. For low ±; these reinforce each other so that expected duration falls as
N increases. For high ±; however, the two e®ects are opposed and the resulting e®ect
on expected duration is unclear.
4.2 Plurality Rule
In this subsection, we consider how the acceptance threshold, x¤; and expected search
duration vary with the number of votes required to stop, M; holding committee size,
N; constant. We ¯rst show that expected search duration is increasing in M: Second,
we show that starting with low values of M, the acceptance threshold increases as M
increases. However, if at some point an increase in M leads to a decrease in the accep-
tance threshold, then further increases in M also cause the acceptance threshold to fall.
In short, the acceptance threshold is either everywhere increasing in M or is hump-
shaped in M. Since, as we showed above, the acceptance threshold is proportional to
the expected payo® for committee members, our results for x¤ have implications for
the optimal plurality rule. We explore these in Proposition 6 below. First, however, we
summarize the e®ects of an increase in M on the acceptance threshold and expected
search duration, holding N ¯xed.
Proposition 5 Expected search duration is increasing in M. There exists a k 2 (0;N]
such that x¤ is increasing in M when M < k, while x¤ decreases in M when M > k.
The fact that increasing M raises expected search duration is not as obvious as
it might appear at ¯rst glance. Of course, increasing M would necessarily increase
expected search duration were x¤ held ¯xed. However, particularly for high values of
M; the acceptance threshold can fall as the plurality requirement increases. That is, we
need to show that the vote aggregation e®ect, which is positive for all M; necessarily
overwhelms the threshold e®ect when the two are opposed.
The intuition for the potentially non-monotonic e®ect of M on the acceptance
threshold has to do with the two externalities in the search-by-committee problem
that were discussed in Section 3. Changing a parameter of the problem { in this case
17the plurality rule { can alleviate one of these externalities at the cost of exacerbating
the other. When M is low, the important externality is that relatively many committee
members (as many as N¡M) may be forced to stop when they would prefer to continue.
The other externality { that relatively few committee members (fewer than M) may be
forced to continue when they would prefer to stop { is less important. When M is high,
the relative importance of these two e®ects is reversed. Increasing M reduces the e®ect
of the ¯rst externality (the one that is especially costly when M is low) and increases
the e®ect of the second externality (the one that is relatively unimportant when M is
low). Thus, when M is low, an increase in the plurality rule makes committee members
better o®; equivalently, increases x¤: When M is high, the e®ect of an increase in the
plurality rule on the second externality may become more important, i.e., x¤ can fall.
The Optimal Plurality Rule
Since the acceptance threshold varies in a systematic way with the plurality rule, and
since the expected payo® for committee members is proportional to x¤; we can set
M to maximize the committee members' expected payo®s. We show that the welfare-
maximizing choice of M increases with ± and that unanimity is optimal for high enough
(but bounded) ±.9
Proposition 6 The welfare-maximizing plurality rule, M, is weakly rising in the dis-
count rate, ±. Given su±cient patience, unanimity is welfare maximizing.
As above, we can gain some intuition by considering an externality interpretation.
The relative costs of the two external e®ects (forcing your fellow committee members
to stop when they would prefer to continue; forcing them to continue when they would
prefer to stop) vary with the discount rate. When ± is low, the cost of being forced
to stop on a low draw is low relative to the cost of being forced to continue on a high
draw, so the optimal M is low. When committee members are patient, i.e., when ± is
high, these relative costs are reversed. The optimal M is thus increasing in ±. If ± is
high enough, the cost of being forced to continue on a high draw is low enough relative
to the cost of being forced to stop on a low draw that the optimal plurality rule is
unanimity. We have illustrated Propositions 5 and 6 in Figure 5.
9A similar result for the special case in which X is uniform on [¡1;1] is proven in the Compte and
Jehiel paper.
18M ± = 0:5 ± = 0:7 ± = 0:9 ± = 0:99
1 0.250004 0.350079 0.450767 0.496838
2 0.250038 0.350695 0.455635 0.507872
3 0.249935 0.351811 0.467617 0.539919
4 0.247398 0.347614 0.474651 0.591816
5 0.234549 0.325010 0.450359 0.607018
6 0.201928 0.276230 0.388368 0.552019
7 0.144056 0.198564 0.290138 0.445081
Figure 5: This table lists x¤ for X uniform on [0;1] and N = 7 for di®erent values of
M and ±. In every column we highlight the highest value of x¤ for the given ±.
We can compare our results on the optimal plurality rule to the extensive literature
on voting with common values and private information, which began with Condorcet
([8]). To ¯x ideas, assume there are two choices, fc1;c2g, and two states of the world,
f!1;!2g. Everyone agrees that choice ci is optimal in state !i, but everyone has private
information about the state of the world (think of a jury that would like to convict i®
the defendant is guilty). In this context, Condorcet argued that for a \large population"
(formally as N ! 1), majority rule yields the correct choice with probability 1 (the
Condorcet Jury Theorem), although he assumed sincere voting. Austen-Smith and
Banks ([2]) proved the Condorcet Jury Theorem for strategic voting, i.e., assuming that
pivotal voters correctly process the information contained in being pivotal. Feddersen
and Pesendorfer ([10]) showed that unanimity is the uniquely suboptimal rule. That
is, requiring any plurality fraction ® < 1 results in the correct action with probability
arbitrarily close to 1 for high enough N, while if unanimity is required, the probability
of a correct choice does not converge to 1.
Clearly, we have a very di®erent model, one with private values and search exter-
nalities, while in the information aggregation literature, values are common and sub-
optimal decisions result from information externalities. Thus, we do not want to push
the comparison too far. To the extent that the information aggregation literature's
main message has been that requiring unanimity is (uniquely) suboptimal, we o®er a
contrasting message; namely, with search externalities, unanimity can be optimal.
195 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze a new type of search problem, search by committee, in which
the decision to stop or to continue searching is made by a group of agents. First, we
show that the problem is well posed in that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists
and is unique given a log concavity assumption on the distribution of payo®s. We then
show that agents in a committee are less picky than they would be were they searching
on their own; that is, they set a lower acceptance threshold. This does not necessarily
imply a lower expected search duration. We ¯nd that the expected search duration
of a committee versus that of a single agent varies with the discount rate in a non-
monotonic way. We also show that committee members are more conservative than a
single-agent searcher in the sense that a mean preserving spread in the distribution of
returns may make them worse o®.
We then examine the e®ects of varying committee size and the plurality rule. We
show that increasing the size of the committee holding the plurality fraction M=N
constant decreases the acceptance threshold; equivalently the expected payo® per com-
mittee member falls. Assuming M < N; expected search duration is shorter for larger
committees if the committee members are su±ciently impatient, but when unanimity
is required, expected search duration increases with N. We also show that, holding N
constant, expected search duration is increasing in M and that the acceptance threshold
is either increasing in M or \hump shaped" in M: Finally, we ¯nd that the welfare-
maximizing plurality rule M increases with the discount rate and that unanimity is
optimal for su±ciently high (but bounded) discount rates.
The single-agent sequential search problem has been extended in many directions.
One could do the same in the search-by-committee problem. We leave these exten-
sions for later research since our aim here is to introduce and analyze the search-by-
committee model in its most basic form.
Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 The stopping value ­(x;N;M) is a weighted average of the truncated means
¹h and ¹` and 0 · ­x(x;N;M) · 1





























Step 2: w0(x) < 0.
Note that w(x) is the wi(x)-weighted average of the function i=N; which is increasing
in i. Thus, if we can show that increasing x causes a ¯rst-order stochastic decrease
in the weights wi(x); we are done. As is well known, the monotone likelihood ratio
property implies ¯rst-order stochastic dominance. That is, if wi(x)=wj(x) increases in






















i¡j¡1 > 0 8 i < j
Step 3: Log-Concavity Completes the proof that ­x(x;N;M) · 1.
­x(x;N;M) = w(x)¹
0






h(x) + (1 ¡ w(x))¹
0
`(x) (by w
0(x) · 0 and ¹h > ¹`)
· 1 (by Log Concavity):
Proposition 1 A symmetric stationary Markov equilibrium exists and is unique.
Step 1: Existence.
We have V (x;¢) continuous in x, ±V (0;¢) = ±
R
xf(x)dx > 0, and ±V (1;¢) = 0.
21Step 2: Single Crossing ) Uniqueness.
Given ±V (0;¢) > 0 and continuity of V (x;¢) in x, if there are multiple equilibria,











(1 ¡ ±P(x;¢))2 ¸ 0;
where the inequality follows from the assumption that Vx ¸ 1 and the fact that the
continuation probability is increasing in x (i.e. Px ¸ 0). Thus, Vx is maximized at
± = 1, but since ±Vx(x;N;M;1) = ±­x(x;N;M) < 1 (by Lemma 1) and ± 2 (0;1), we
have a contradiction. Thus, ±Vx(x¤;¢) < 1 and there cannot be multiple equilibria. ¤
Proposition 2 (Less Picky) Committee members are less picky than a single searcher.
Proof: The single searcher can achieve at least as high an expected payo® as a
committee member by mimicking the committee behavior. That is, assume a symmetric
committee threshold x¤ and let the single searcher commit to the following strategy:
1. Generate N ¡ 1 draws from a standard uniform distribution.
2. Stop whenever M or more of these draws exceed 1 ¡ F(x¤).
3. Continue if fewer than M ¡ 1 of these draws exceed 1 ¡ F(x¤).
4. Employ threshold x¤ otherwise.
The single searcher, however, can do better. For example, suppose the single searcher
draws x < x¤ and that M of the N ¡ 1 draws exceed 1 ¡ F(x¤). The single searcher
can increase his or her expected payo® by continuing. The expected payo® for a single
searcher thus exceeds the expected payo® for a committee member: e x > x¤: ¤
Lemma 2 If N ¡ n > M ¡ m > 0, 9 ¹ x 2 (0;1) such that P(x;N;M) ¡ P(x;n;m)
satis¯es single crossing, negative for x < ¹ x and positive for x > ¹ x.
22Step 1: Likelihood Ratio Simplification.










) Px(x;N;M) = f(x)
N!








Note that h(0) = h(1) = 0 and that h(F) has a unique maximum in (0;1) at
F = ((N ¡ n) ¡ (M ¡ m))=(N ¡ n):
Step 2: The Single Crossing Result.
lim
F!0
h(F) = 0 and P(0;¢) = 0:




h(F) = 0 and P(1;¢) = 1 ) P(x;N;M) > P(x;n;m) for x near 1:
Thus, by continuity, P(x;N;M) = P(x;n;m) for at least one x 2 (0;1); and if
P(x;N;M) and P(x;n;m) cross more than once in (0;1); they must cross at least
3 times. Call these three crossing points 0 < F1 < F2 < F3 < 1: By the endpoint
conditions, we must have h(F1) > 1; h(F2) < 1; and h(F3) > 1: But h is continuous
and unimodal when N ¡ n > M ¡ m > 0, a contradiction. ¤
Proposition 3 If M < N, then committees conclude search more quickly than indi-
viduals for su±ciently low and su±ciently high rates of patience.
Step 1: If M = 1; committees conclude search more quickly 8± 2 (0;1).
23Trivially, P(x;N;1) < F(x) = P(x;1;1) for each x 2 (0;1): Denote the sin-
gle agent acceptance threshold by e x(±). By Proposition 2, x¤(N;1;±) < e x(±), so
P(x¤(N;1;±);N;1) < F(e x(±)).
Step 2: When N > M ¸ 2; Committees search more quickly for low ±.
Given N > M ¸ 2; 9 ¹ x 2 (0;1) s.t. P(x;N;M) < F(x) 8x < ¹ x by Lemma 2. Since
e x(±) is strictly increasing in ±, e x(0) = 0, and lim±!1 e x(±) = 1, we can de¯ne ±L by
e x(±L) = ¹ x. Thus, for all ± < ±L
e x(±) < ¹ x ) P(e x(±);N;M) < F(e x(±)) (by Lemma 1)
) P(x
¤(N;M;±);N;M) < F(e x(±)) (by Proposition 2).
Step 3: Committees conclude search more quickly for high ±.





¤(N;M;±);N;M) < 1 = lim
±!1
F(e x(±));
Since P(x¤(N;M;±);N;M) and F(e x(±)) are continuous in ±, 9 ±H < 1 such that
P(x¤(N;M;±);N;M) < F(e x(±)) 8 ± > ±H. ¤
Proposition 4 If M = ®N, then x¤ falls in N. If ® < 1; there exists a ±L > 0 such
that expected search duration falls in N for ± < ±L: If ® = 1; expected search duration
rises in N:
Proof Preliminaries: While our committee problem is only de¯ned for non
negative integer values of M and N such that M · N, we can use the equivalence
between the binomial and beta cdfs to write all our functions as continuous functions
of N and M. Note that since we have set M = ®N in this proposition, the partial
derivatives that we discuss, VN(x¤;N;®N;±); SN(x¤;N;®N;±); and ­N(x¤;N;®N;±);
are calculated taking into account the dependence of M on N; i.e., we take the partial
derivative of the function with respect to N plus ® times the partial derivative with
respect to M:
Step 1: ­N(x;N;®N) · 0.
24Recall from Lemma 1, that ­(x;N;®N) = w(x)¹h(x)+(1¡w(x))¹`(x). Thus, we












































































G(1;M ¡ N;M;¡q=(1 ¡ q))
G(1;M ¡ N;M + 1;¡q=(1 ¡ q))
:











G(1;M ¡ N;M + 1;z);







k with (b)k =
(b + k ¡ 1)!
(b ¡ 1)!
and (c)k =
(c + k ¡ 1)!
(c ¡ 1)!
:
Let z = ¡q=(1 ¡ q) < 0 and recall that M = ®N. Then we complete the proof by
showing: G(1;(® ¡ 1)N;®N;z)=G(1;(® ¡ 1)N;®N + 1;z) falls in N.11
The hypergeometric series G satis¯es the identity:





zG(1;b;c + 1;z) + 1 = 0;
or in our notation
(z ¡ 1)G(1;(® ¡ 1)N;®N;z) ¡ (
1
®
)zG(1;(® ¡ 1)N;®N + 1;z) + 1 = 0
10There are many references for hypergeometric functions, e.g., [9] and [1].
11The proof that this ratio is falling in N was provided by Frits Beukers, Mathematics
faculty, Utrecht University.
25) ®(1 ¡ z)
G(1;(® ¡ 1)N;®N;z)
G(1;(® ¡ 1)N;®N + 1;z)
= ¡z + ®G(1;(® ¡ 1)N;®N + 1;z)
¡1:
Note that the LHS of the previous equality equals (1 ¡ z)w(q): We can show that the
RHS of the equality is decreasing in N by showing that G(1;(® ¡ 1)N;®N + 1;z) is












where the second equality follows from change of variable y = (1¡s)®N. Simpli¯cation
yields



























where h(N;y) = 1 + (
q
1¡q)(1 ¡ y1=®N) ¸ 1 given ®N > 0; q ¸ 0; and y 2 [0;1]. Thus,
w(q) decreases in N and so ­N(x;N;®N) < 0:
Step 2: x¤ falls in N.
Using the equilibrium condition, x¤ = ±V (x¤;N;®N;±) = ±S(x¤;N;®N;±)­(x¤;N;®N);





1 ¡ ±Sx(x¤;¢)­(x¤;¢) ¡ ±S(x¤;¢)­x(x¤;¢)
(2)
The denominator is positive as Sx < 0 and 1¡S­x > 0 (by Lemma 1), and so x¤ falls
in N if VN(x¤;¢) < 0.
We now show that VN(x¤;¢) < 0: Consider ¯rst
V±(x;¢) =
(1 ¡ P(x;¢))P(x;¢)














Thus, VN(x;¢) ¸ 0 implies VN±(x;¢) > 0; and we have
VN(x;N;®N;±) ¸ 0 ) VN(x;N;®N;1) > 0 8± < 1:
This is equivalent to
VN(x;N;®N;1) · 0 ) VN(x;N;®N;±) < 0 8± < 1:
Finally, since S(x;N;®N;1) = 1 and SN(x;N;®N;1) = 0; we have
VN(x;N;®N;1) = ­N(x;N;®N) · 0 (by step 1).
Since ± 2 (0;1); x¤ must fall with N:
Step 3: 9±L > 0 such that Search duration falls in N for ± < ±L.
By Lemma 2, P satis¯es single crossing in x. Let ¹ x be the threshold de¯ned in
Lemma 2. That is, for all x < ¹ x; we have P(x;N;®N) < P(x;n;®n) when N > n:
Since x¤(n;®n;±) is continuous in ± and lim±!0 x¤(n;®n;±) = 0, there exists a ±L > 0
such that x¤(n;®n;±) < ¹ x for all ± < ±L. From Step 2, we have that x¤(N;®N;±) <
x¤(n;®n;±): Therefore, P(x¤(N;®N;±);N;®N) < P(x¤(n;®n;±);n;®n) for all ± <
±L.
Step 4: Search duration rises in N when ® = 1.
When ® = 1, ­(x;N;N) = ¹h(x) is constant in N. Further our equilibrium
condition is x¤ = ±S(x¤;¢)­(x¤;¢), and so when ® = 1, x¤ and S(x¤;¢) must move in
the same direction in N. By Step 2, x¤ falls in N, and so S(x¤;¢) must fall as well.
Since S is inversely related to P, and search duration is given by (1¡P(x¤;N;®N))¡1,
search duration must rise in N. ¤
Proposition 5 Expected search duration is increasing in M. There exists a k 2 (0;N]
such that x¤ is increasing in M when M < k, while x¤ decreases in M when M > k.
27Step 1: Search Duration Rises in M.
Assume M < M0 and x¤(N;M;±) < x¤(N;M0;±). Since the probability of contin-
uing, P; increases in x and M: P(x¤(N;M;±);N;M) < P(x¤(N;M0;±);N;M0).
Assume instead x¤(N;M0;±) < x¤(N;M;±). Expected search duration is inversely
related to S, so we must show that S(x¤(N;M;±);N;M;±) falls in M. De¯ne x0 = x¤(N;M0;±)





0) = x ¡ x
0








0)­(x;M) = x ¡ x
0






0)] = x ¡ x
0
, [S(x;M) ¡ S(x
0;M






We wish to show that S(x;M) > S(x0;M0), i.e. that the left hand side is positive.
Since the expected payo® conditional on stopping, ­; is increasing in M (see the proof





0;M) ¡ ­(x;M)] ¸ x ¡ x
0 + [­(x
0;M) ¡ ­(x;M)]





which gives the desired result. ¤
Step 2: 9k 2 (0;N] such that for all M < k; x¤(M + 1) > x¤(M); while for
all M > k; x¤(M + 1) < x¤(M):
Henceforth we abuse notation and let x¤(M) = x¤(N;M;±).
Step 2-A: A Useful Single Crossing Property.
De¯ne Á(x;M) ´ P(x;¢)x + (1 ¡ P(x;¢))­(x;¢). Since, x¤ = ±V (x¤;¢), we have
V (x¤(M);N;M;±) = Á(x¤(M);M). As with ±V (x;¢)¡x, ­x · 1 implies that ±Á(x;M)¡
x satis¯es single crossing, positive for x < x¤(M) and negative otherwise. In turn this
implies:
x
¤(M + 1) < x
¤(M) , Á(x
¤(M);M + 1) < Á(x
¤(M);M):
28Routine algebra establishes that:
Á(x;M + 1;¢) ¡ Á(x;M;¢) = p(x;N;M)[x ¡ Ã(x;M)];
where Ã(x;M) ´ M
N ¹h(x) + (1 ¡ M
N )¹`(x), i.e. the expected payo® when exactly M
members vote to stop with threshold x.12 Altogether we may conclude:
x¤(M + 1) < x¤(M) , x¤(M) < Ã(x¤(M);M)
x¤(M + 1) > x¤(M) , x¤(M) > Ã(x¤(M);M)
(3)
Step 2-B: x¤(1) > x¤(0).
When M = 0: P = 0 and ­ = E[X], and we have:




Thus, x¤(1) > x¤(0) by condition (3).
Step 2-C: x¤(M + 1) · x¤(M) ) x¤(M + 2) < x¤(M + 1).
x
¤(M + 1) · x
¤(M) ) x
¤(M) · Ã(x
¤(M);M) (By condition (3))
) x
¤(M + 1) · Ã(x
¤(M + 1);M) (By Ãx(x;M) · 1)
) x
¤(M + 1) < Ã(x
¤(M + 1);M + 1) (By Ã " M)
) x
¤(M + 2) < x
¤(M + 1) (By condition (3)):
Step 2-B asserts that x¤ is initially increasing in M, and Step 2-C asserts that once
x¤ stops increasing in M; it strictly decreases for higher values of M: ¤
Proposition 6 The welfare-maximizing plurality rule, M, is weakly rising in the dis-
count rate, ±. Given su±cient patience, unanimity is welfare maximizing.
12For an intuition: We are comparing the value when requiring M + 1 versus M
votes, ¯xing the threshold and continuation value at x. The di®erence in values is
then the probability that exactly M values exceed the threshold, p(x;N;M), times the
di®erence in value from continuing x and stopping with exactly M values above the
threshold Ã(x;M).
29Step 1: The welfare maximizing M weakly rises in ±.
Suppose not. Let MH < ML be welfare maximizing for ±H > ±L, and assume ML
does not maximize welfare at ±H, i.e. x¤(N;MH;±H) > x¤(N;ML;±H). Since ML is
welfare maximizing for ±L, x¤(N;ML;±L) ¸ x¤(N;ML ¡ 1;±L), which implies
x
¤(N;ML ¡ 1;±L) ¸ Ã(x
¤(N;ML ¡ 1;±L);ML ¡ 1) (by condition (3))
) x
¤(N;ML ¡ 1;±H) ¸ Ã(x




¤(N;ML ¡ 1;±H) (by condition (3))
) x
¤(N;ML;±H) ¸ x
¤(N;MH;±H) (by Prop. 5 and ML > MH);
which contradicts ML not being welfare maximizing for ±H.
Step 2: For sufficiently high ±, x¤(N;N;±) > x¤(N;M;±) for all M < N.










¤(N;M;±) > 0 (by condition (3))
) 9±
¤ < 1 s.t. x
¤(N;N;±) > x
¤(N;M;±) 8 ± > ±
¤;
where the last implication follows from the continuity of x¤ in ± and Ã in x. ¤
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